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I. THE RESEARCH PUZZLE
Traditionally, the analysis of violent conflicts has been a
rather straightforward task. Unitary State actors have confronted
each other over divisible spoils concerning territory, natural
resources, or the seat of political power. If diplomacy failed to
resolve the crisis, economic and military coercion was used to set-
tle the scores and decide the outcome between the adversaries.
In most cases, a victor emerged from the ensuing contest of the
political will and material capabilities between States. This image
on the dominance of the inter-state war in world history is, to
some extent, a caricature; yet, it taps some key features of the
"old" international system that is now gradually giving way to the
"new" one.
On the other hand, this picture of the inter-state system is
still true in the sense that the world continues to be organized
into national containers of territorial and material power that
keeps, despite the tendencies of economic and cultural globaliza-
tion, international interdependence limited and partial in
nature. Governments continue to have an option to go to war,
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even though it invariably produces extensive human suffering
and material destruction. Indeed, so far it has been possible to
think in terms of military-political victory and material gains from
war. While still possible today, such a prospect for a gainful inter-
state war is more and more remote to the international political
reality. This is especially true of wars of aggression, against which
the UN Charter confers to States the right of self-defense, which
right most States would act upon even if it would engender
extensive costs.
Domestic polarization between social classes has created a
somewhat similar situation within nations; if tensions have
erupted into a civil war, the political divisions and loyalties have
been in most cases quite clear. In principle, such conflicts could
be resolved peacefully by following the Dahrendorfian model of
conflict resolution, which would prescribe the organization of
the parties, the recognition of their legitimacy, the specification
of the contesting agendas, and the subsequent search of the com-
mon ground through a compromise. The isolation of intra-
national conflicts within national borders increased the destruc-
tiveness of civil wars, but made them at the same time somewhat
organized and predictable. The nature of conflict was altered, of
course, if an external intervention, legally or illegally, took place.
Such an intervention could both constrain and escalate violence.
Today, the nature of conflict is quite different. This does
not concern only violent clashes between new types of actors, but
also disputes over new kinds of issues, such as environment,
human rights, and culture. A main reason for the changing
nature and context of violent conflicts is the gradual thinning of
the state layer between global and local levels which interact now
much more closely than in the past. The emergence of new
global-local linkages has been facilitated by the liberalization of
national economies and the ensuing globalization of the world
economy, which have opened up new transnational spaces. In
terms of definition, globalization means the expansion and deep-
ening of transnational market relations, which, as a result, pene-
trate into local societies and have a variety of political, social, and
cultural consequences.
The interconnected processes of globalization and localiza-
tion have had three main consequences for conflict formations.
First, the possibility of major inter-state wars has been waning;
save for a couple of world regions, such as South Asia and the
Middle East, such a war is very unlikely today. Second, in the
1990's, civil war has replaced inter-state war as the dominant
form of collective violence. In 1989-98, out of a total 108 wars,
only seven were inter-state wars, while in nine intra-state wars, a
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foreign intervention had taken place; all the rest were domestic
wars. It seems, however, that the number of civil wars is now
declining after their number peaked in 1991-92, with a possibility
that a new upward trend has started in the very late 1990's.1
Thus, it is not implausible that civil war is, together with
inter-state war, a receding form of violent conflict. One can also
suggest that international intervention in civil wars is declining as
its costs have become higher, due to the more complex and frag-
mented nature of these wars. If such an intervention happens, it
is more likely to be multilateral than unilateral in nature as its
legitimization would be somewhat easier in that way. Recent hec-
tic debates about the legal and political acceptability of humani-
tarian intervention shows, though, that there is no global
consensus on the matter.2
Against this backdrop, one can suggest that civil wars are
gradually replaced by new forms of violence that are fragmented
and decentralized in nature. Such violence can be used by small
groups, often terrorist ones, to pursue specific political goals.
Even more often, this "microviolence" is used by organized gangs
and warlords to obtain material gains and political power. Such
"infrapolitical" violence becomes integrated in social structures
and cannot be separated easily from their daily functioning.
Instead of being an exception, an abnormality, violence becomes
a routine, a daily event, especially in the expanding and
polarized urban centers of developing countries. As a conse-
quence, the borderline between political violence, organized
crime, and shadow economies becomes blurred.'
My argument is, thus, that infrapolitical violence is an
emerging form of conflict organized around the global-local
linkage. It is fueled by economic and social dislocations due to
globalization and the local responses to them. To be sure, not all
responses to globalization are violent, but they often include
muted and indirect forms of resistance, which surprisingly often
have an environmental aspect. This may be due to the fact that
1. See generally Peter Wallensteen & Margaretta Sollenberg, Armed Conflict:
1989-98, 36J. PEACE RES. 593 (1999). For a largely similar conclusion on the
frequency of ethnic conflicts, see Ted Robert Gurr, Ethnic Warfare on the Wane,
79 FOREIGN AFF., June 2000, at 52.
2. For a good overview of these debates, see DANISH INST. OF INT'L REL.,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS (1999).
3. See generally HANS MAGNus ENZENSBERGER, CIVIL WARS FROM L.A. TO
BOSNIA (1992); DAVID KEEN, THE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF VIOLENCE AND CIVIL
WARS (Int'l Inst. of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 320, 1998); Michel
Wierviorka, Le nouveau paradigme de la violence, in UN NouvEAu PARADIGME DE LA
VIOLENCE? (Michel Wierviorka ed., 1998).
2001]
596 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15
environmental issues provide multiple (and often depoliticized)
sites and strategies to resist or adopt the processes of globaliza-
tion. In other words, "the environment may then be understood
as political space, a critical venue where civil society is voicing its
concerns."
4
It is obvious that new types of violent conflicts cannot be
managed and resolved by the' old means (and this difficulty may
even be evident in the remaining inter-state conflicts). Parties to
present civil wars and urban violence are not organized as cen-
trally as in the past, but they consist of loosely operating factions
whose professional military training, political experience, and
economic resources are limited. The factions are headed by war-
lords or urban gang leaders who do not necessarily pursue any
larger political goals beyond sel-enrichment and the control of
the political turf required for it.
Therefore, one cannot speak of well-structured political
agendas in conflicts that would be amenable to bargaining and
compromises. As a result, conflicts cannot be resolved by simply
"splitting the difference" in order to "get to yes." Instead, the
abolition of violence calls for the social and political transforma-
tion of the conflict structure. To some extent, this transforma-
tion can be due to environmental changes, as they may lead to
shifts of power between various actors and prompt the rise of
new actors, such as environmental movements.5
II. ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES
Departing from the analysis of the changing nature of vio-
lence and its connections with economic globalization, this paper
considers the role of natural resources and environmental factors
in the outbreak and transformation of deadly conflicts. The dis-
tinction made here between natural resources and environment
is deliberate; renewable and non-renewable resources are consid-
ered tangible, material assets, while environment refers to the
ecological context in which social systems operate. As natural
resources-such as oil, minerals, forests, and cropland-are usu-
ally divisible, they easily become objects of conflicts between the
parties. Disputes over resources and their control, as a form of
4. James H. Mittelman, Resisting Globalization: Environmental Politics in East-
ern Asia, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE AsIA-PAcmc: CONTESTED TERMTOmEs (Kris
Olds et al. eds., 1999).
5. For a more detailed analysis, see Raimo Vdyrynen, From Conflict Resolu-
tion to Conflict Transformation: A Critical Review, in THE NEW AGENDA FOR PEACE
RESEARCH 135 (Ho-WonJeong ed., 1999).
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territorial conflict, have, especially in the absence of economic
interdependence, a tendency to become a zero-sum game.
A. Environment
"Environment" cannot be sliced up in the same way between
the parties because of its contextual and historical elements.
True, resources can also be considered contextual as is the case
of the commons, or the resources in the sea, including the sea-
bed minerals. The commons can be defined as the common her-
itage of the people when their resources are expected to be
exploited by an international body that is commonly managed
and in which various principles of equity apply. In reality, the
pooled use of resources has turned out to be difficult to arrange
and, as a result, their exploitation has been usually privatized and
marketized in one way or another.
In the case of environment in the ecological sense, the con-
textual element is different; it is due to the indivisible aspects of
the biosphere mediated on the human and natural systems by
climatic variations and other changes that can have extensive and
enduring effects. As an example, one may mention the historical
cycles of El Nifio that have caused the rise and global spread of
natural disasters. Such disasters have, in turn, toppled empires
and paved the way for the rise of new power centers. These
cycles are almost completely outside the influence of human
actors.6
In other words, the global ecosystem is a closed system in
which human societies both prosper and suffer. One of the criti-
cal questions is to what extent and in what way the economy and
society can internalize the environmental changes. It is some-
times asserted that the rise of environmental movements has
been prompted by increasing environmental stress due to the
process of economic globalization or the spread of postmaterial
values. It is more plausible, though, that the politics of resistance
and conflicts are connected with the distributive effects of the
economy-environment nexus. In other words, the conflict poten-
tial related to environment is due to the inability of the economy
to internalize the ecological consequences of its productive activ-
ities. Thus, the causes of environmental conflicts are real
problems that people face in their everyday lives.
7
6. See generally BRIAN FAGAN, FLOODS, FAMINES AND EMPERORS: EL NINO
AND THE FATE OF CIVILIZATIONS (1999).
7. SeeJoan Martinez-Alier, EnvironmentalJustice as a Force for Sustainability,
in GLOBAL FuTUREs: SHAPING GLOBALIZATION 148 (Jan Nederveen Pierterse ed.,
2000).
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Various actors may have common economic interests in the
utilization of natural resources, although they often also compete
for them. However, due to the indivisibility and non-excludabil-
ity of many ecological factors, the interests of relevant actors are
even stronger in the common control and use of the environ-
ment, and in the prevention of its deterioration. The common
interests in the use of resources, on the one hand, and environ-
ment, on the other, are due to different factors; cooperative utili-
zation of resources is based on the agential division of labor, such
as market exchanges or formal agreements, while ecological
cooperation arises from the need of the actors to cope with the
natural system that they cannot modify, at least over a short term.
The distinction between resources and environment can
also be formulated in terms of the "dilemma of common inter-
est" versus the "dilemma of common aversion."' The dilemma of
common interest arises when independent decisions lead to
Pareto-deficient outcomes that can be achieved only if all actors
eschew their dominant strategy.
This dilemma is most frequent in the competitive exploita-
tion of natural resources that may, as a result, be depleted, lead-
ing to economic and political problems. In such a situation, the
actors would gain most from multilateral cooperation, which may
be, however, difficult to arrange if the substitutability of
resources is low for both parties. A set of case studies on fisheries
management indicates that in such a situation, States have a ten-
dency to resort to unilateral actions.9
The dilemma of common aversion arises, on the other hand,
when actors have a common interest in avoiding a particular out-
come, such as the large-scale deterioration of the natural envi-
ronment. These kinds of situations are often characterized by
multiple equilibria of which actors may be in agreement on one,
but in disagreement on others. Thus, they may agree on the gen-
eral need to protect the environment, but are at odds on how to
best accomplish that general aim. An obvious solution is to
establish a coordination regime that embodies rules and conven-
tions that permit the actors' expectations to converge on the
proper strategies to protect the environment and generate funds
for their implementation.10
8. See ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND
CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 32-38 (1990).
9. See generally J. Samuel Barkin & Elizabeth R. DeSombre, Unilateralism
and Multilateralism in International Fisheries Management, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
339 (2000).
10. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 36.
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In the last decade, examples of environmental/ecological
conventions and regimes abound. They have been established to
control climate change, prevent air and marine pollution, con-
trol international toxic waste trade, and protect biodiversity and
endangered species." Environmental regimes come in various
shapes and sizes, but they also face some common problems,
including those of compliance, and its monitoring and enforce-
ment. These problems are accentuated by the diversity and mul-
tiplicity of actors involved in the formation and operation of
environmental regimes; they range from governments to transna-
tional organizations and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). For instance, transnational corporations (TNCs) can
have quite different attitudes toward environmental agreements
depending on the sector of their activity and the distribution of
the benefits and costs of protection.
1 2
Another way to illustrate the distinction between resources
and environment as conflict issues is to note that the former tend
to be private goods, while the latter has a strong aspect of public
goods. Marvin Soroos, among others, has pursued this line of
analysis in the study of environmental security. He distinguishes
unilateral and collective responses to milieu problems that mani-
fest themselves, in turn, either as threats or vulnerabilities. In
other words, States can focus on the prevention and mitigation
of either threats or vulnerabilities, and address both of them
either by unilateral or collective means. This approach leads to
four different types of protective responses by States aiming,
respectively, at self-prevention, collective prevention, self-
defense, or collective defense. 3
Collective measures recognize the public-goods character of
environmental threats and vulnerabilities, while unilateral mea-
sures deal with resource problems mostly as private, divisible
goods; egoistic interests prompt unilateral actions at the expense
of the other actors. In sum, environmental/ecological problems
tend to lead to dilemmas of common aversion rather than to
those of common interest. However, this does not guarantee
that the responses of actors to environmental challenges are nec-
essarily collaborative as there are usually several competing solu-
tions. Despite their predominantly contextual nature,
environmental problems also have private aspects that elicit com-
11. See GARETH PORTER & JANET WALSH BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PoLrriCs 67-106 (2d ed. 1996).
12. See generally Aseem Prakash et al., Multinational Corporations and Inter-
national Environmental Policy, 8 Bus. & CONTEMP. WORLD 119 (1997).
13. See generally Marvin Soroos, Global Change, Environmental Security, and
the Prisoner's Dilemma, 31 J. PEACE RES. 317 (1994).
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petitive responses and, therefore, need coordination and conflict
resolution.
B. Resources
The study of resource conflicts can rely on two different
assumptions. The source of conflict can be construed to be
either the scarcity or the abundance of resources. The emphasis
on scarcity departs often from simple economic models of con-
flict; if there are not enough resources for everyone, a rivalry for
them emerges driving up the price and leading, ultimately, to a
fight over their control. In more complex formulations, one
should consider, among other things, substitution effects
between different types of resources and various possibilities of
price controls and production quotas. There is some evidence
on the regulation of fisheries indicating that appropriate private
mechanisms may be more effective in sustaining the catch than
the setting of formal quotas.
1. Resource Scarcity
According to Thomas Homer-Dixon, the environmental
scarcity of a renewable resource can be due to the depletion of
such a resource, from increased demand for it (due, for instance,
to population growth) or from unequal distribution of and,
therefore, access to it.' 4 Deforestation is a typical example of
environmental scarcity due to the depletion of a resource, while
demographic pressure augments the demand for resources and
their privatization hampers access to it. Homer-Dixon suggests
that environmental scarcity can lead to conflicts, for instance, by
displacing people and bringing migrants into harmful contact
with other identity groups. Environmental scarcity may also be a
source of economic decline, which can lead, through weakened
political institutions and social fragmentation, to internal vio-
lence. The causal link between resource scarcity and violent con-
flict is seldom direct, but it is mediated by various institutional
and cultural factors.15 Similar views can be found from the early
works concerning the impact of fertile and infertile land on the
resort to military force and defense against it.
16
14. See THOMAS F. HOMER-DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, ScAicrry, AND VIOLENCE
133-68 (1999).
15. See id.; see also MICHAEL RENNER, FIGHTING FOR SURVIVAL: ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DECLINE, SOCIAL CONrLICT, AND THE NEW AGE OF INSECURrlY (1996).
16. See Daniel H. Deudney, Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from
the Greeks to the Global Era, in CONTESTED GROUNDS: SECURITY AND CONFLICr IN
THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 36-40 (Daniel H. Deudney & Richard A
Matthew eds., 1999) [hereinafter CONTESTED GROUNDS].
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Homer-Dixon and his associates tested the relationship
between resource scarcity and violence with case studies and
found a positive relationship between them. Pakistan is consid-
ered a case in which both rural and urban violence has roots in
the increasing scarcity of land and other resources. 7 Similarly,
the scarcity of land and water in the Ferghana Valley in Central
Asia has exacerbated social problems associated with the eco-
nomic decline, environmental crisis, and unemployment. They
have contributed to growing social and political tensions, which
have not yet, however, broken out into major violence.18
Along the same lines, a modeling exercise suggests that the
per capita resource scarcity increases violence and further
destruction of resources, which may ultimately lead to the col-
lapse of the political and economic system. In fact, there is a bi-
directional relationship between violent conflict and scarcity of
resources.19 Finally, a systematic statistical study has discovered
an empirical relationship between environmental scarcity (espe-
cially land degradation) and civil conflict. The authors note,
however, that economic factors provide better explanations of
violence than environmental ones. The latter factors are more
capable to account for small rather than large wars. Thus, while
resource scarcities are present in many civil conflicts, they do not
necessarily cause them, but rather interact with poverty and ine-
quality to produce a conflict-prone society. Moreover, at least so
far, environmental scarcities have contributed to social frictions
rather than to major violence.
20
In sum, there seems to be a positive relationship between
environmental scarcity and violence. This relationship, however,
17. See Peter Gizewski & Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Case of Pakistan, in
ECOVIOLENCE: LINKS AMONG ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION, AND SECURITY 147
(Thomas Homer-Dixon &Jessica Blitt eds., 1998) [hereinafter ECOVIOLENCE].
18. See CTR. FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION, CALMING THE FERGHANA VALLEY.
DEVELOPMENT AND DIALOGUE IN THE HEART OF CENTRAL ASIA 60-68 (1999).
19. See generally John W. Maxwell & Rafael Reuveny, Resource Scarcity and
Conflict in Developing Countries, 37J. PEACE RES. 301 (2000).
20. See generally Wenche Hauge & Tanja Ellingsen, Beyond Environmental
Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict, 35 J. PEACE RES. 314 (1998). Gfinther Bdch-
ler concludes that of 51 wars underway in 1993, serious environmental degrada-
tion could be observed in 22 of them. The pattern was most visible in Africa
and somewhat less pronounced, but yet real in Asia and Central America. See
generally Gfinther Bachler, Welche Rolle spielt Okologie als Ursache und Medium von
(zukunfligen) Gewaltkonfikte im internationalen System, in TREIBEN UMWELT-
PROBLEME IN GEWALTKONFLIKTE? 0KOLOGISCHE KONFLIKTE IM INTERNATIONALEN
SYSTEM UND MOGLICHKEITEN IHERER FRIEDLICHE BEARBEITUNG (J6rg Callies ed.,
1994); Gfinther Bachler, The Anthropogenic Transformation of the Environment: A
Source of War, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND WAYS OF
COOPERATION (Kurt Spillman & GOnther Bdchler eds., 1995).
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is usually partial and indirect. It hinges on the definition of the
independent and dependent variables, and varies by the level of
analysis.
2 1
Causality between environment and conflict can also be
reversed. As the Vietnam War proved in the most extreme way,
violence often results also in the destruction of environment in
addition to its human toll. Further evidence on extensive ecolog-
ical destruction caused by bombing campaigns and other military
operations can be obtained from Kuwait and Iraq in 1990-91 and
Kosovo in 1999.
In many crisis areas, including West Africa and Southeast
Asia, logging of forests has been an important way to finance war,
and maintain a corrupt government and its client list support
networks. In addition to contributing to deforestation, military
conflict discourages generally long-term investment in produc-
tion, and steers money either abroad or to activities, often extra-
legal in nature, in which economic gains are immediate. War
economies are run by cash transactions and short-term gains and
not by long-term productive investment-because by the next
day participants may be dead and money does not matter to
them any longer.
22
Resource and demographic factors may, through lateral
pressures, also have an influence on the propensity to wage inter-
state wars. Countries with a high population growth are more
prone to become involved in wars with other countries, although
they do not necessarily initiate these wars. However, it seems that
high population density contributes to war only if the country is
highly militarized.23 Conflicts over resources are often thought
to manifest themselves mostly as border clashes. In a study of
21. See Gfinther Baechler, Environmental Degradation and Violent Conflict:
Hypotheses, Research Agendas and Theory-Building, in ECOLOGY, POLITICS, AND VIO-
LENT CONFLICT 11-27 (Mohammed Suliman ed., 1999) [hereinafter ECOLOGY].
See also Nils Peter Gleditsch, Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the
Literature, 35 J. PEACE RES. 381 (1998); GUNTHER BACHLER, VIOLENCE THROUGH
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRIMINATION: CAUSES, RWANDA ARENA, AND CONFLICT MODEL
(1999) [hereinafter BACHLER, VIOLENCE].
22. See Robert T. Deacon, Deforestation, Investment, and Political Stability, in
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONFLICr AND APPROPRIATION 131 (Michelle R. Gar-
finkel & Stergios Skaperdas eds., 1996). See also Paul Collier & Willem Cunning,
War, Peace and Private Portfolios, 23 WORLD DEv. 233 (1995); Paul Richards, The
Sierra-Leone Liberia Boundary Wilderness: Rain Forests, Diamonds and War, in Asu-
CAN BOUNDARIES: BARRIERS, CONDUITS AND OPPORTUNITIES (Paul Nugent & A.I.
Asiwaju eds., 1996).
23. SeeJaroslav Tir & Paul F. Diehl, Demographic Pressure and Interstate Con-
flict: Linking Population Growth and Density to Militarized Disputes and Wars 1930-
1989, 35J. PEACE RES. 319, 323-24 (1998).
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fourteen intergovernmental agreements on boundary conflicts in
the post World War II period, it turned out that in eight cases the
parties had mutual rivalry over natural resources in the common
border area.
2 4
The finding that land degradation has the strongest relation-
ship with civil conflict is supported by the observation that arid
lowlands are, in particular social conditions, prone to violent
conflicts.25 These findings indicate that there is a group of coun-
tries in which the demographic pressure, degradation and scar-
city of land, and the overall decline of the public institutions and
of the economy create a society from which people either try to
exit or in which they violently confront each other.
Burundi, Chiapas, Haiti, and Rwanda have been mentioned
as cases where the pressure on land has become so pervasive that
it has set off a spiral of political and ethnic violence.26 One has
to keep in mind, on the other hand, that references to natural
and demographic conditions as causes of conflict and misery may
be used as a justification for political and economic actions
rather than being a valid description of reality.
27
The Rwandan case indicates that while land scarcity and the
deterioration of its quality can be closely linked with domestic
violence, it cannot be seen in separation of other factors. In
Rwanda, the combination of the clan organization and social
stratification created a volatile situation, which could be easily
"ethnicized" for political purposes. This trend was further rein-
forced by the transition from the traditional social hierarchy to
national politics where new ethnic fault lines were created. The
colonial rule contributed to the institutionalization of these
differences.
Neither ethnic divisions nor resource scarcity were the key
reasons for the 1994 genocide and other violence in Rwanda.
However, the increasing scarcity of fertile land and demographic
pressures, together with the collapse of the country's model of
economic development, largely underwritten by foreign aid,
24. See generally KJELL-AKE NORDQUIST, PEACE AFTER WAR: ON THE CONDI-
TIONS FOR DURABLE INTER-STATE BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS (1992).
25. See BACHLER, VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 64-71.
26. See Valerie Percival & Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Case of Rwanda, in
EcoviOLENCE, supra note 17, at 201 (discussing the land pressures in Rwanda);
Philip Howard & Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Case of Chiapas, Mexico, in Ecovi-
OLENCE supra note 17, at 19 (discussing land pressures in Chiapas). See also Ana
Esther Cecena & Andres Barreda, Chiapas and the Global Restructuring of Capital,
in ZAPATISTA! REINVENTING REVOLUTION IN MEXICO (John Holloway & Eloina
Pelaez eds., 1998) (discussing land pressures in Chiapas).
27. See ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES: POLITICS & THE DISASTER RELIEF
INDUSTRY IN AFRICA 126-27 (1997).
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made the situation even tenser. The scarcity of natural capital
became even more of a political factor as a consequence of the
discrimination against small rural producers. Thus, "the crucial
point in Rwanda is that the rural-urban gap was overarched by
clear-cut ethnopolitical segregation used by the ruling elite to
exclude the other group almost completely from any resource."28
Often the scarcity and degradation of soil interact with the
political or ethnic claims for land rights, mobilizing peasant
movements to fight with each other or landowners. In several
cases, such as Kenya and Senegal, the struggle for land pits the
farmers and herdsmen against each other. Similarly, as a case
study of India shows, the interests of various stakeholders in the
use of forests often diverge and lead, under the influence of
unclear property rights and political interference, to conflicts.29
Zimbabwe provides additional recent evidence on how the
government can manipulate the struggle for land to sirengthen
its own faltering position. There, deforestation, siltation, over-
grazing, and other environmental problems have contributed to
the eruption of the land crisis. However, even more potent and
direct causes of land conflict than the environmental factors are
the misguided intervention of the State in agriculture and the
economic decline of the country, partly due to its intervention in
the war in Congo. Moreover, the Mugabe government has used
land invasions as much to fight its own domestic opposition as
help its own supporters to acquire land from the white owners.3 0
In general, these developments reflect the fact that in Africa an
increasing number of people are landless because of the interac-
tions between poverty, privatization of land rights, the scarcity of
land, and politics.31 Water is another resource that threatens to
become scarce and, thus, fuels conflicts over its control and use.
There are well-known cases of water conflicts related either to
the scarcity of water (e.g. Central Asia or the Sahel) or the com-
petition for water resources in shared rivers. The Middle East,
South Asia, and the Nile region provide examples of conflicts in
28. See BACHLER, VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 113-66. See generally PETER
UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISE IN RWANDA (1998).
29. See generally INDRA DE SoysA & Nits PETrER GLEDITCH, To CULTIVATE
PEACE: AGRICULTURE IN A WORLD CoNFICr (Int'l Peace Res. Inst., Report No. 1,
1999).
30. See Tapera Knox Chitiyo, Land Violence and Compensation: Reconceptual-
ising Zimbabwe's Land and War Veterans' Debate, TRACK Two, May 2000, at 2.
31. See William B. Morgan, Poverty, Vulnerability, and Rural Development, in
SUSTAINING THE FUTURE: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN
SuB-SAHARAN AFICA 17, 36-38 (George Benneh et al. eds., 1996).
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which the distribution of water resources and the political-territo-
rial divisions have clashed with each other.32
The Colorado and Rio Grande river basins provide another
telling example. The 1944 treaty between Mexico and the
United States obliges them to share water in the Rio Grande res-
ervoirs. Texan farmers argue, however, that Mexicans are hoard-
ing water upstream depriving them of adequate irrigation, and
expanding their own agricultural exports to the U.S. market
under the NAFTA agreement. Mexicans refer, on the other
hand, to extraordinary circumstances, primarily draught, as the
reason for their actions. In general, the conflict potential is due,
in addition to the increasing scarcity of water, to the rapid maqui-
ladora industrialization of the border region."
As a general rule, the riparian States should avoid the asym-
metric utilization of water resources that would benefit one actor
at the expense of the others. The simplest case is when the
upstream State interrupts or reduces the flow of the river and the
downstream States suffer, as a result, from water shortages. The
dilemma of common interest becomes even more pronounced if
the previous international overlay, such as dependence on great
powers, disappears, and the local actors have to decide on their
own the use and share available resources.
Yet, one should not jump, as some authors have done, too
easily to the conclusion that the future wars will be increasingly
over water. True, in several places, water is either overused com-
pared with the existing resources or badly wasted. China is a case
in point, where the growing scarcity of water is already creating
new social tensions and threatens both the human security and
economic growth of the country. The essence of its water prob-
lem is that the country has over twenty percent of the world pop-
ulation, but only seven percent of its freshwater resources. Also,
other populous countries-such as India, Pakistan, Mexico, and
even the United States-have severely mismanaged their ground-
water resources and face a real resource crisis in this regard.34
32. See Ashok Swain, Water Scarcity as a Source of Crises, in WAR, HUNGER,
AND DISPLACEMENT: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 179 (E. Wayne
Nafziger et al. eds., 2000) (providing an overview) [hereinafter WAR, HUNGER,
AND DISPLACEMENT]; see also MASAHIRO MURAKAMI, MANAGING WATER FOR PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES (1995) (regarding the Middle
East).
33. See Dan McGraw, A Boiling Tex-Mex Water War, U.S. NEws AND WORLD
REP., May 1, 2000, at 24; BACHLER, VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 203-04.
34. See Jacques Leslie, Running Dry: What Happens When the World No
Longer Has Enough Freshwater, HARPER'S MAG., July 2000, at 37.
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On the other hand, while the scarcity of groundwater is
becoming a major political issue, predictions about "water wars"
over shared rivers seem to be overblown. According to Gleditsch
and Hamner,35 more than 250 river systems are shared between
two or more countries. In an empirical study of these rivers, they
find that water scarcity only has a limited tendency to foster con-
flicts. Moreover, if scarcity is coupled with a shared river, the
probability of cooperation, rather than conflict, between coun-
tries increases significantly. A common resource problem can
also prompt closer cooperation.
This is evidenced, for instance, by the move towards cooper-
ation in the utilization of the water resources of the Nile. The
main change has been the increasing willingness of Egypt to
cooperate with Ethiopia and Sudan, which concluded in an
agreement on the use of Blue Nile waters in 1991. The new
phase of cooperation is managed by the Nile Basin Initiative
(N.B.I.), which is a formal organization set up by the riparian
States, and with the support of the World Bank, to implement
the 1996 Nile River Basin Action plan on the preservation and
distribution of the river water. 6
Water conflicts usually involve multiple and diverse actors,
including transnational corporations. For instance, the dispute
over the use of water in the Thika River and Ndanaini Dam in
Kenya is primarily between Nairobi City Council and Del Monte
Kenya Ltd., which has large pineapple plantations in the coun-
try.3 7 Water scarcity is also spreading from regions, such as Mid-
dle East, Central Asia, and Southern Africa, which have been
suffering from it for decades, to areas that we often believe to
have too much water, including Pacific Asia.38
In Central Asia, the Soviet era was disastrous for the water
resources of the region. The Soviet legacy there includes, in
35. See Nils Petter Gleditsch &Jesse Hamner, Shared Rivers, Conflict, and
Cooperation, Paper presented to the 42nd Annual Convention of the Interna-
tional Studies Association (Feb. 21-24, 2001).
36. Brain Posthumus, Nile Basin Nations Move Towards Cooperation, CON-
Fucr PREVENTION NEWSL. (The African Center for the Constructive Resolution
of Disputes (A.C.C.O.R.D.)), Feb. 2000, at 4. The rules to manage the equita-
ble use of water in shared rivers are regulated by the Helsinki Rules on the Uses
of the Waters of International Rivers. International Law Commission (I.L.C.)
has been also active in devising rules for the use of river water in the Nile and
other places. See id. at 5-6.
37. See John Rao Nyaoro, Case Study on Kenya River Watershed Management
and Arising Conflicts, in COOPERATION OR CONFucr: WAYS OF MANAGING SCARCE
NATURAL RESOURCES IN AFRICA 63 (Anne Palm ed., 1999).
38. ALAN DUPoNT, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY IN PACIFIC ASIA (Int'l
Inst. of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 319, 1998).
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addition to problems related to nuclear waste, the growing scar-
city of water and cultivable land. On the other hand, the newly
independent States in Central Asia have only limited experience
and means to deal with these resource problems. Instead of Mos-
cow, decisions must now be made in the local capitals under con-
ditions in which territorial sovereignty and resource
interdependence do not match each other. In addition to the
competing territorial claims in the Ferghana Valley, Kyrgyztan
and Uzbekistan have a bilateral conflict over water resources and
energy production in the Syr Darya.39
In general, it has been asserted that in post-communist soci-
eties, neither bureaucrats nor companies are well accustomed to
deal with environmental problems and conflicting claims con-
cerning them, in an effective and pragmatic manner. This has
led to efforts to mislead the public by denying or falsifying infor-
mation and, thus, mismanage environmental and resource
conflicts.4 °
2. Resource Abundance
Another perspective on resource conflicts emphasizes,
instead of their scarcity, the abundance of resources as a cause of
violence. This is especially the case if resources are easily trad-
able and generate major economic value. Such tradable com-
modities include oil, some mineral resources, diamonds, drugs,
and tropical hardwood. Obviously, in a competitive situation,
resource scarcity and wealth cannot be strictly separated from
each other as one's control of wealth usually means scarcity for
others. Thus, for instance in Central Asia, the scarcity of land
and water coexist with drug trafficking, organized crime, and cor-
ruption that create an abundant, but skewed informal economy.
These factors are intermingled and cannot easily be distin-
guished from each other in the explanation of conflicts.4 1
Yet, it is argued that the emphasis on resource wealth and
the ways it is distributed in society offers a more rewarding
approach to the explanation and understanding of resource-
39. See BACHLER, VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 201-203. See also Erika
Weinthal, Making Waves: Third Parties and International Mediation in the Aral Sea
Basin, in WoRDs OVER WAR: MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY
CONFLICT 263 (Melanie C. Greenberg et al. eds., 2000); Nikita F. Glazovsky, The
Aral Sea Basin, in REGIONS AT RISK: COMPARISONS OF THREATENED ENVIRONMENTS
92 (Jeanne X. Kasperson et al. eds., 1995).
40. See Maria Csutora, The Mismanagement of Environmental Conflicts,
ANNALS Am. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Scx., July 1997, at 52.
41. See James Fairhead, The Conflict Over Natural and Environmental
Resources, in WAR, HUNGER, AN DisPLAcEMENT, supra note 32, at 147.
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related conflicts than the focus on scarcity. The underlying rea-
son for this choice appears to be that people are more easily
pushed to action by the prospect for major material gain than
the suffering from inadequate availability of, and access to,
resources.
42
Angola (oil and diamonds) and Columbia (drugs) provide
additional examples on how resource abundance and its unscru-
pulous exploitation for political gain has led to relative scarcities
manifested in large-scale poverty. In Angola, both M.P.L.A. and
U.N.I.T.A. have developed their own war economies fueled by
the trade in oil and diamonds, respectively. Oil and diamond
companies, especially Gulf Oil and De Beers, have served as
intermediaries between the warring parties and the global mar-
ket.4" It is also a well-known fact that the mining and marketing
of diamonds have been sponsored and have sustained factional
warfare in Sierra Leone.44
Conflicts due to scarcity and wealth are distributive in
nature; thus, both of them are relative phenomena. One differ-
ence between them is, however, that the absolute amount of
resources is bigger in an abundant society where, as a conse-
quence, the struggle for profits derived from the control of
resources becomes fiercer. This is indicated by the intensity of
factional fighting in such resource-abundant countries as Angola,
Zaire/Congo, and Liberia. On the other hand, in a scarce soci-
ety the human consequences of warfare are, due to the lack of
economic cushion, always devastating, as the case of Afghanistan
shows. In the case of scarcity, those excluded from the use of
resources, especially food and water, often perish or, at least,
they have to escape and become environmental refugees. This
may be also the case in resource-rich countries, but in them there
are more alternatives.
The distributive and relative nature of scarcity means that it
is not necessarily a natural condition, but it is often "socially gen-
erated" and "deliberately manufactured." Certainly, scarcity can
be innate due to the domestic system of power that maintains
inequities and limits access to resources. On the other hand, it
can also be "manufactured" by external agents, such interna-
tional financial institutions, that can impose on a country's poli-
42. See id.
43. See PHILIPPE DE LEBILLON, A LAND CURSED BY ITS WEALTH? ANGOLA's
WAR ECONOMY 1975-99 (World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Res., Research in Progress
Series, 1999); INST. FOR SEC. STUD., ANGOLA'S WAR ECONOMY THE ROLE or OIL
AND DIAMONDS (Jackie Cilliers & Christian Dietrich eds., 2000).
44. See generallyJOHN L. HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND THE STRUC-
GLE FOR DEMOCRACY (2001).
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cies of economic austerity and retrenchment.4 5 In the extreme
case of intentionally produced scarcity and suffering, we can
speak of a predatory State in which resources are exploited, more
or less exclusively, by the ruling elite for its own benefit.
This pessimistic view has been reinforced by recent research
showing that even absolute scarcity does not prevent warlords
and commercial middlemen from exploiting the people and,
thus, enriching themselves. In fact, there is an emerging strand
of research providing extensive documentation that even in civil
wars and famines there are political and military factions that
grow richer and more powerful at the expense of the suffering
masses. As the cases of Tajikistan, Sudan, and former Yugoslavia
clearly show, many civil wars have become a shadow industry,
and, in a sense, a form of organized crime. In such wars, eco-
nomic motives play a major role and contribute to the prolonga-
tion of fighting and suffering.46
If the absolute amount of resources in a society is high, the
average risk of death is usually smaller. However, if the resources
are valuable and tradable, the leading political and military elite
is able to exploit them and create an independent economic
base for the undemocratic exercise of their power. Resource-
rich societies have a tendency to be "cursed" and become politi-
cally polarized and corrupted. Resources generate rents that the
elite can use to establish a client list and centralized system of
power. In such a case, non-representative political systems are
maintained by the resource rents. In extreme cases, such as Iraq
and Zaire, autocratic rulers can create a system in which people
suffer even from absolute economic deprivation and are, moreo-
ver, subjected to political repression and physical violence.
4 7
In sum, in resource conflicts, there are two main routes to
violence: either (a) scarcity creates a competitive situation that
forces people to fight each other for the control of land, water,
and other resources; or (b) a rent-seeking society develops a ver-
tical pattern of economic deprivation, political exclusion, and
physical repression. In both cases, the key issue is how and by
whom resources are divided in society. The present theory and
practice of conflict resolution does not have much to say about
45. Nicholas Hildyard, Blood, Babies and the Social Roots of Conflict, in Ecot-
ocy, supra note 21, at 3, 13-14.
46. See generally DE WAAL, supra note 27; KEEN, supra note 3; WILLIAM
RENO, WARLORD PoLIcs AND AFRicAN STATES (1998); ECONOMIE DES GUERRES
CnvLEs, (FranfoisJean &Jean-Christophe Rufin eds., 1996); GREED AND GRIEV-
ANCE: ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVL WARS (Mats Berdal & David M. Malone eds.,
2000).
47. See generally Vfayrynen, supra note 5.
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the resolution of resource conflicts; neither do external pres-
sures and incentives provide any easy remedies to deep-seated
structural problems in society. In many cases, the only solution
seems to be the redistribution of power by a social revolution-
informed increasingly by religious and ethnic identities rather
than by traditional political ideologies.
Conflict can also be horizontal when resource-rich regions
and their people are excluded by other power centers from
enjoying the benefits of their assets.48 If the income from the
exploitation of natural resources benefits primarily the center
and its ruling elite, the situation obviously fuels resentment and
even secessionism in relation to the central government. The
Niger delta region in Nigeria is an example of such an exploited,
resource-rich region where people rebel against the govern-
ment.49 In addition to human misery, the biodiversity and water
supply of the delta have been suffering from the oil production.
Bougainville provides another and rather extreme example of
how the environmental destruction by strip mining has mobil-
ized political and cultural resistance to the lopsided exploitation
of abundant natural resources.5 °
On the other hand, resource-rich regions have a tendency to
demand a greater control of the profits derived from the
exploitation of their resources. This obviously undermines the
position of the central government and its capability to keep its
country together. This development can be observed, for
instance, in Russia and Indonesia. In the latter, much of the
mineral wealth is concentrated in four of its provinces among
which at least Aceh and Irian Jaya are demanding greater politi-
cal autonomy or even independence.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
A. A Classification of Threats
Much of the recent literature on environmental conflicts has
focused on the concept of environmental security. The discus-
sion has dealt with different components of the concept and, in
particular, the problem of its scope. Both narrow and compre-
hensive definitions of security, the latter including the environ-
mental dimensions, have their advocates. In addition, there are
methodological disputes on how to best approach the concept of
48. See V61ker B6ge, Mining Environmental Degradation and War: The Bou-
gainville Case, in ECOLOGY, supra note 21, at 211.
49. See id.
50. See generally B6ge, supra note 48.
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environmental security.51 The purpose of this article is not, how-
ever, to delve into these issues, but to approach the concept from
a somewhat different angle.
The security aspects of resource and environmental conflicts
are quite different. Resources are conventionally divided into
renewable or non-renewable ones. Despite the difference in
their renewal, resources are, in most cases, divisible between the
parties. In social terms, the main difference between these two
types of resources concerns the inter-generational equity. The
struggle for non-renewable resources, their overuse, and division
between the parties reduce the opportunities of the coming gen-
erations to consume them. However, this "shadow of the future,"
due to scarcity and inequity, is not usually strong enough to dis-
courage the parties from continuing and even escalating the
resource conflict.
International environmental threats can be divided into
three main categories: competitive, contaminating, and contex-
tual threats.5" Competitive threats are due to the rivalries over
divisible resources among States and other relevant actors. Con-
taminating threats result from cross-border pollution, whether
carried by air or water. Contextual threats concern all of human-
kind and cannot be easily divided between its individual or col-
lective members. Global warming and the thinning of the ozone
layer are the best-known examples of such contextual threats.
Competitive threats concern the use of resources, while contami-
nating and contextual threats are environmental in the eco-
nomic sense of the word.
In the taxonomic effort below, I have tried to characterize
the types of environmental threats by the following criteria: divis-
ibility of resources concerned, the political intentionality of
action producing the threat, the probability of the environmen-
tal risk, the extent of its putative impact in terms of human costs,
and the time span during which the risk usually materializes.
The result is summarized in the following table:
53
51. See BARRY BuZAN ET AL., SECuRrT. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS,
71-93 (1998); Daniel Deudney, Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from
the Greeks to the Global Era, in CONTESTED GROUNDS, supra note 16, at 25; Eric
Stern, The Case for Comprehensive Security, in CONTESTED GROUNDS, supra note 16,
at 127.
52. See Raimo Vfayrynen, Environmental Security in a Conflict Zone: The Case
of the Korean Peninsula, in PEACE STUD. IN THE COLD WAR ERA 11 (Korean Nat'l
Comm'n for UNESCO, 1999).
53. See id. at 15-16.
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TYPES OF ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY
THREATS CONTEXTUAL CONTAMINATING COMPETITIVE
Divisibility Indivisible Divisible Divisible
Intentionality Unintended Unintended Intended
Time span Long Medium Short
Probability LOw High Medium
Impact Major Medium Medium
Example Ozone layer Acid rain Resource conflict
It is clear that almost all the suggestions in this table can be
challenged by various counter-arguments. For instance, the divis-
ibility of the burdens of pollution and of resource rivalry among
actors is a relative rather than an absolute issue. The uneven
structure of national and international societies means that costs
and benefits of all "goods" and "bads" can, to some extent, be
divided among the participants. In fact, it has been rightly
observed that contemporary environmental problems and their
human impact can be understood only if they are placed in the
context of the highly unequal global division of labor.54
Often, though not always, stronger actors get a better deal in
distributive struggles. On the other hand, there are multiple
examples, ranging from free trade to environmental coopera-
tion, of how weaker actors are free riding and, thus, benefiting
from the public goods that stronger actors provide. In fact, what
is needed is a variant of the center-periphery model to account
for the costs of both the degradation and protection of the envi-
ronment. The task would then be to estimate the distribution of
costs and benefits of various practices and strategies between the
center and the periphery.
It is also difficult to assess the issue of the political intentional-
ity behind economic and other policies producing environmen-
tal threats. If diseases are included as part of the environment,
they can be used as an example of intentionality. In recent years,
there has been quite some concern about "bioinvasion," the
spread of fatal new diseases either among humans (e.g., AIDS
and ebola) or animals (mad cow disease) with a potential impact
on humans. These diseases have fostered a global feeling of inse-
curity and created doubts about the capability of public health
54. See Michael Redclift & Colin Sage, Resources, Environmental Degrada-
tion, and Inequality, in INEQuALITY, GLOBALIZATION, AND WORLD POLITICS 122-49
(Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods eds., 1999).
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systems to deal with them effectively. 5 Despite widespread con-
cern, it is very rare to argue that the diseases are spread inten-
tionally by some groups or individuals.
On the other hand, "environmental terrorism" clearly
embodies the notion of intentionality as all terrorist acts are sup-
posed to be conducted with a political motivation in mind. Thus,
one can speak of environmental terrorism when a group uses
ecological violence to instill fear in a larger population. Environ-
mental terrorism also may occur when a group's actions clearly
break national and international laws banning the use of weap-
ons of mass destruction, harm human life by destroying the envi-
ronment, and damaging the ecosphere itself.56
Yet, the concept of environmental terrorism remains vague
(but you will recognize it when you see it). No doubt, the explo-
sion of a dam and flooding the downstream to instill fear in or
otherwise harm an adversary is an act of environmental terror-
ism. Recently, there has been an increasing emphasis in public
debates on the risk of using chemical and biological weapons for
terrorist purposes. It has been noted that societies are almost
defenseless against such health and environmental risks due to
potential terrorist acts. On the other hand, it has been pointed
out that such looming security threats are easily exaggerated and
various defensive remedies to potential terrorist actions could be
an expensive and misguided cure.57
To my mind, intentionality is a central issue in the definition
of environmental security and threats to it. In most explorations,
intentionality is either neglected or interpreted very broadly. In
the latter case, one possibility is to focus on the consequences of
environmental problems, and conclude that all threats that jeop-
ardize the security of the earth and reduce human welfare
should be "securitized." In other words, threats to environmen-
tal security should be assessed by the consequences of an action
irrespective of the singular or collective intentions behind it.
As Radoslav Dimitrov points out, this view leads to the omni-
present, existential interpretation of environmental security.5"
55. See Janet Ginsburg, Bioinvasion, Bus. WLy, Sept. 11, 2000, at 70-78;
Laurie Garrett, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL PUBLIC
HEALTH 50-120 (2000).
56. See generally Daniel M. Schwartz, Environmental Terrorism: Analyzing the
Concept, 35 J. PEACE REs. 483 (1998).
57. See Andrew J. Bacevic, Bad Medicine for Biological Terror, 44 ORBiS 221,
233 (2000); see also Henry Sokolski, Rethinking Bio-Chemical Dangers, 44 ORns 207
(2000).
58. See Radoslav Dimitrov, The Concept of Environmental Security: Multi-
ple Meanings and Dissimilar Implications 16 (March 15, 2000) (conference
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This perspective has been adopted, however, by Marc A. Levy,
who notes that "environmental degradation constitutes a direct
physical threat to U.S. security interests when environmental
damage results directly in the significant loss of life or welfare of
U.S. citizens, or otherwise impairs our most important national
values."59 Environmental risks are defined and assessed in this
approach by their impact on society, and national security
becomes thus equated with individual human security.60
I am inclined to define environmental security in more nar-
row terms by requiring a direct link between the intention and
the outcome. In so doing, many environmental risks, short of
direct political connections, are left out of the definition. There-
fore, while damage done to the ecosystem and human well being
by negligence and mismanagement no doubt creates adverse
consequences, I would be cautious to "securitize" such threats.61
The existence of "genuine" security risks requires that someone
has an intention to inflict harm upon others and sufficient
means to do so. By linking the intention and effect, I am sug-
gesting that the existence of security threats implies almost a
criminal motive for which an individual or collective actor can be
held accountable.
Otherwise, one has to convert the study of security into the
investigation of "system effects" which are due to the indirect,
delayed, non-linear, and complex consequences of social
action.2 My purpose is not to deny the complexity and mul-
tidimensionality of security problems, but rather to emphasize
that they should be studied as results of intentional and, thus,
accountable actions. Then, the analysis remains actor-centric,
instead of being system-centric, and explores the causal relations
between environmental factors and violence.63
Finally, the time span, likelihood, and the human impact of
different types of environmental threats are also difficult to esti-
mate. The recognition of the fact that environmental risks may
paper, on file with author); see also Simon Dalby, Contesting an Essential Complex:
Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse, in CRITICAL SECURITY
STUDIES: CONCEPTS AND CASES 3, 15-18 (Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams
eds., 1997).
59. Marc A. Levy, Is Environment a National Security Issue?, 20 INT'L SECUR-
ry 35, 46 (1996).
60. See generally BuzAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 23-46 (describing "securi-
tization" and the method of using it in the study of security).
61. Id. (describing the idea of "securitization" and the method of using it
in the study of the concept and problem of security).
62. ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECrS: COMPLEXITY IN POLrICAL AND SOCIAL
LIFE 27-37 (1997).
63. Cf BACHLER, VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 44-49.
ENVIRONMENT, VIOLENCE, AND POLITICAL CHANGE
have a long gestation period and their likelihood and impact var-
ies helps to modify the earlier emphasis on their directed and
intentional nature. In other words, the effort to trace the inten-
tionality and accountability of threats to security may require a
laborious effort to get to their root causes over time and space.
B. Resource Conflicts and Security
The framework developed above is easy to apply to resource
conflicts as they are usually due to intentional actions by the par-
ties over divisible assets. The parties to a conflict struggle for the
access to natural resources to derive financial and political bene-
fits from the control or sale of these assets. Resource conflicts
have almost always had a territorial dimension, and thus, they
have implications for national sovereignty. The role of natural
resources varies obviously from one conflict to another and are
hardly ever the sole cause of war, but a part of the larger pattern
of causes.
Thus, neither the Ecuadorian-Peruvian nor the Ethiopian-
Eritrean border war was fought for the control of resources, but
they have been motivated more by historical reasons and the elite
definitions of national prestige. On the other hand, the conflict
in the South China Sea can hardly be understood without consid-
ering the resource factor, including oil and fisheries. As a result,
military tensions in the area can be fully contained only if a joint
and effective regional regime is developed to share and manage
resources.
64
Analyses of resource wars have become more abundant in
recent years. Serious research refuses, however, to attribute a
central role to resources as a cause and trigger of collective vio-
lence.65 Yet, resource factors are today a more potent cause of
violent conflicts than environmental/ecological factors more
broadly understood. This is largely due to the fact that the impli-
cations of resource disputes for national and economic security
are more immediate, direct, and tangible. Any number of
authors has exaggerated the role of environmental problems as
security threats. In reality, they have given rise to only limited
security problems-one does not simply go to war because of the
acid rain or river pollution that your neighbor engenders.
If we move from the national, actor-centric interpretation of
security to the concept of human security, which is more compre-
64. See generally Francisco A. Mango, Environmental Security in the South
China Sea, 28 SEcunrrv DIALOGUE 97 (1997); DuPoNr, supra note 38.
65. Often equivocating on this point, see THoMAs F. HOMER-DIXON, ENVI-
RONMENT, SCARCITY, AND VIOLENCE (1998).
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hensive in scope, we probably have to admit the growing rele-
vance of environmental threats. Although such threats do not
jeopardize national security, they may well be damaging to indi-
viduals because of the skin cancer or dioxin in water. However,
the tracing of environmental threats is a difficult and time-con-
suming task. Such risks tend to sneak into the human body and
have hidden and delayed effects rather than use the front door
for a direct attack. The individualization of security risks has its
drawbacks, however, not least for the reason that individual
responses (e.g., to avoid sun or not to drink contaminated
water) do not match collective intentionality. In the end, individ-
ual intentionality can only be derived from collective
intentionality.66
CONCLUSION
The resolution of environmental conflicts cannot be dis-
cussed in isolation of their origins, character, and development.
This article has suggested that the key difference in the ecologi-
cal conflict sphere lies between resource conflicts and environ-
mental conflicts. They are distinguished from each other, among
other things, by the nature and divisibility of the values involved.
Resource conflicts amount to a disagreement on the distribution
of a positive asset, which usually has a market value; the more
valuable and tradable the commodity, the bigger is its pecuniary
significance for the parties involved. As a result, they want to
control the resource, its market, and its price in order to benefit
from it.
The main method used to control marketable resources is
their privatization, often irrespective of the costs engendered to
other participants. The exploitation of a natural resource invari-
ably produces externalities which can be either positive (e.g.,
value-added derived from their processing) or negative (e.g., pol-
lution), and either unidirectional or mutual in nature. Positive
externalities are, as a rule, divided between the actors in the mar-
ket, while the management of negative externalities engender a
burden-sharing problem as a part of the general collective action
problem for the community concerned. Such management also
calls to draw up rules and regulations concerning the production
and distribution of negative externalities.67 Conflicts over natu-
ral resources can be either "macro-political" or "micro-political."
66. JOHN R. SERLE, CONSaRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALrrv 24-25 (1995).
67. For a more detailed analysis of externalities, see TODD SArNDLER,
GLOBAL CHALLENGES: AN APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL, POLITICAL, AND Eco-
NOMIC PROBLEMS (1997).
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By macro-political resource conflicts, I refer to major wars
between States or within States between the government and
opposition on the control of an important source of resource.
The oil factor behind both the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and
the response of the U.S.-led coalition clearly make it a macro-
political resource conflict. On the other hand, the fight of par-
ties to a civil war over the control of a diamond mine (Sierra
Leone and Angola), drug-producing region (Columbia and
Burma), or a strategic factory (Tajikistan and Bosnia) refers to a
micro-political resource conflict in which the source of war
finances is at stake.
Environmental factors are different in that they usually can-
not be privatized because they are not divisible and/or they do
not have a standard market value. Instead, they are natural parts
of the ecosystem to which human beings also belong. Often envi-
ronmental problems result as an externality from the utilization
of divisible natural resources by public authorities or market
actors. As companies, and autocratic States for that matter, have
only individual rationality, they will not take collective responsi-
bility for the consequences of their actions unless the community
decides about appropriate rules and enforces them.
The governance of negative environmental externalities is a
major domestic and international issue, which creates a conflict
over burden sharing. One of the key problems is how burden
sharing can be linked up with profit sharing in the exploitation
of a resource that has created environmental externalities in the
first place. In other words, how those who benefit from the
exploitation of resources contribute to the management of nega-
tive environmental externalities. This problem can be
approached both by means of State intervention to set up envi-
ronmental conventions and also through market-like arrange-
ments, such as tradable pollution permits.
68
The resource and environmental conflicts are fundamen-
tally different, yet deeply interrelated. The market conflicts over
resources are solved, in part, by means of commercial competi-
tion and, in part, by means of State intervention. The commer-
cial conflict is supposed to be settled where it happens, viz. in the
market. If the intervention of the State by means of protection-
ism, subsidies, and discriminatory legislation becomes excessive,
then the standard methods to solve international economic con-
68. See Geoffrey Heal, New Strategies for the Provision of Global Public Goods:
Learning from International Environmental Challenges, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 220 (Inge Kaul et al. eds.,
1999).
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flicts are used. They include, for instance, the application of the
regional competition policy, which is well developed especially in
the European Union, or they resort to the dispute settlement
mechanism of the World Trade Organization. In fact, there are
several mechanisms and methods to solve market-related dis-
putes between the parties.69
The mechanisms to resolve environmental conflicts are
quite different when compared with resource conflicts, especially
if they concern the distribution of the environmental protection
costs. In the absence of any supreme international political or
legal authority, governments must come to an agreement
through voluntary negotiations. The bargaining process obvi-
ously uses all standard techniques of influence ranging from per-
suasion to blackmailing and even coercion.
Negotiations about international environmental agreements
and burden sharing of the costs of their implementation and
enforcement are not, however, primarily about power politics.
Recently, it has been increasingly stressed that a facilitative and
supportive approach, including capacity building, is more effec-
tive in ensuring compliance with the environmental and other
international norms.7" On the other hand, it has been noted
that this "transformational" approach has not generated very
effective normative and institutional systems of governance as
shown by the allegedly limited accomplishments of various inter-
national environmental treaties. Using additional evidence, a
group of authors suggest that non-transformational agreements
may produce deeper cooperation and more effective enforce-
71ment practices.
In sum, the conflict over the burden sharing of the protec-
tion costs of the ecosystem against pollution and contamination
has to take place through appropriate regimes. Sometimes, it is
assumed that these regimes will emerge through a "benign" polit-
ical process for which the "epistemic communities" have laid the
groundwork. In reality, however, environmental regimes are
often results of hard bargaining between governments, non-gov-
69. See Beth V. Yarborough & Robert M. Yarborough, Dispute Settlement in
International Trade: Regionalism and Procedural Coordination, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM 134 (Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner eds.,
1997).
70. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY:. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
(1995).
71. See generally George W. Downs et al., The Transformational Model of Inter-
national Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
465 (2000).
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ernmental organizations, and transnational corporations. More-
over, the field of environmental problems is so complex that
there is no simple regime solution to all of them. Each specific
environmental problem, and conflict associated with it, requires
its own solution7'
In the beginning of this paper, attention was paid to the
changing nature of violence in the international system. Inter-
state wars and perhaps even civil wars are becoming more rare,
and a new type of fragmented "infrapolitical" violence is emerg-
ing. Obviously, resource conflicts are more closely related to this
kind of decentralized violence than environmental conflicts.
The armies of warlords and urban gangs need financial resources
to be able to grab local power and its material spoils. These
assets may be natural resources, such as diamonds and hard-
wood, but often they are not thought of as a resource. Drugs and
parts of endangered species, such as ivory, are "new" types of
resources that are used to finance warfare. Traditional tech-
niques of conflict resolution are seldom helpful in the efforts to
mitigate and resolve these kinds of micro-political resource
conflicts.
73
Against this backdrop, environmental conflicts are different.
They are more structured, and the contested issues are more
clearly defined. Key actors are governments, non-governmental
organizations, and corporations rather than criminal gangs and
ethnic clans. Therefore, standard conflict resolution techniques
may be more appropriate in their case. A main problem is that
the costs of protecting the environment against deterioration are
so huge and affect the entire society so deeply that compromises
on the standards and methods of protection are difficult to come
by. For this reason, financial burden sharing is politically diffi-
cult to agree on, although various analytical approaches exist to
solve the conflict.
In the resource conflict, the ultimate issue is "who gets what,
how much, and by what means," while in the environmental con-
flict the query is "who pays, how much, and to whom?" As a rule,
winners in resource conflicts are reluctant to contribute to the
burden sharing of managing the consequences of even their own
actions. However, in the end, the rules of the exploitation of the
72. See generally Matthijs Hisschem6ller & Joyeeta Gupta, Problem-Solving
through International Environmental Agreement: The Issue of Regime Effectiveness, 20
INT'L POL. Sci. REv. 151 (1999).
73. See Raimo Vdyrynen, Weak States and Humanitarian Emergencies: Failure,
Predation, and Rent-Seeking, in 2 WEAK STATES AND VULNERABLE ECONOMIES:
HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 437 (E. Wayne Natziger
et al. eds., 2000).
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global resource endowment cannot be delinked from the man-
agement of the global environmental problems as they stand in a
cause-effect relationship, albeit complex and indirect, to each
other.
